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Abstract: Fuzzy logic dates back to 1965 and it is related not only to current areas of 
knowledge, such as Control Theory and Computer Science, but also to traditional ones, such 
as Philosophy and Linguistics. Like any logic, fuzzy logic is concerned with argumentation, 
but unlike other modalities, which focus on the crisp reasoning of Mathematics, it deals with 
common sense reasoning; i.e., with approximate reasoning. Although the teaching of logic 
has formed part of mainstream education for many years, fuzzy logic is a much more recent 
inclusion. In this paper we emphasize the desirability of having illustrative examples related 
to students’ everyday activities, such as sports, in order to introduce fuzzy logic in higher 
education. Taking an example from cycling, we show, step by step, how to model an 
approximate reasoning regarding the choice of a ratio (a combination of freewheel and 
chainring) in order to advance more or less with each rotation of the pedals. Led by this 
example, a number of alternatives attending to the formal representation of the premises and 
the ways of inferring a plausible conclusion are analyzed. The choices made between 
alternatives are justified. We show that the conclusion inferred in the example is consistent 
with the models selected for premises and fuzzy inference and similar to that concluded by a 
human being.  








1. Introduction. Fuzzy logic and education 
Disciplines that are subject to being taught are shaped over time. There are the ever-present areas, 
such as Mathematics, Philosophy, Linguistics or Physics, and other more recent ones, such as 
Psychology or Logic. Even with relatively few years of autonomy in education, Logic includes 
traditional areas, such as Aristotle´s syllogistic, and other more innovative ones, such as Zadeh’s fuzzy 
logic. In effect, a modern development of logic is fuzzy logic. Since 1965, as quoted in [14], it has 
garnered increasing credibility and dissemination. Institutionally, formal logic is taught in the schools 
of Philosophy, Mathematics and, more recently, in Computer Science. 
Although fuzzy logic is a recent field, its subject matter is related not only with current areas, but 
also with traditional ones. Even though fuzzy logic’s prominence is due mainly to its role in modern 
control systems, vagueness has influenced the philosophical debate since ancient times. Thus, Aristotle 
highlighted the philosophical dimension of the formal study of vagueness relating the future contingent 
phrases (‘Tomorrow there will be a sea battle’, a statement that today is neither true nor false) with 
discussions on free will. Old areas of Mathematics, such as topology, measurement theory or 
algorithms, have been also ‘fuzzified’. But certainly, the closest relationship with fuzzy logic is with 
Advanced Computing. Therefore, fuzzy logic has to do with at least two areas whose teaching has long 
been institutionalized, Mathematics and Philosophy, but also with a more recent one, 
Computer Science. 
Fuzzy logic has not remained a mere theory; on the contrary, it has given rise to manufactured 
products, of industrial or domestic use. Therefore, and this case is not too frequent in the history of 
science, it is a theory that has achieved its own technology. From this point of view, fuzzy logic is not 
only a scientific matter but also a tool with which to do things; i.e. an applied logic. 
Like any logic, fuzzy logic is concerned with argumentation. But unlike others, such as bivalent 
logic, which deals with precise arguments from Mathematics, fuzzy logic deals with common sense 
reasoning; i.e. with approximate reasoning [15]. While crisp arguments are characteristic of mature 
stages of our cognitive development, individuals come across common argumentation from childhood 
[3]. Thus, a three-year-old child may argue with some difficulty about a statement of elementary 
geometry involving crisp reasoning, but he/she will almost certainly be able to decide reasonably, and 
without apparent effort (using an argument rather implicit than explicit), on whether or not he/she 
wants fewer vegetables or whether or not he/she want more cookies, ‘fewer’ and ‘more’ being 
approximate quantifiers. 
In adolescence, the student will have to study numerous subjects and, to successfully face this task, 
will have to develop skills involving the management of imprecision: heuristics for learning and data 
memory techniques (e.g. mnemonics rules), strategies for relating different information, reasoning by 
analogy to find solutions based on similar, previously solved cases, etc. These tasks involve implicit 
rather than explicit, approximate rather than crisp reasoning. Furthermore, in each specific area, many 
arguments have inaccurate and incomplete data, requiring approximation and tuning. This type of 
argumentation will be abundant in the areas of Social Sciences [2] and Humanities and also, somewhat 
surprisingly, not infrequent in Physics: experiments are sometimes verified to a degree; laws 
frequently include not all, but the majority of cases, etc. In mathematics, fuzzy logic is more 




appropriate than bivalent logic for representing the intuition underlying mathematical proofs, often 
requiring vague natural language verbalization until the concept is grasped [1,8]. 
Finally, at university, the student may wish to become acquainted with fuzzy logic in order to 
increase his/her knowledge of logic, his/her cultural skills or to acquire an instrument for solving 
problems or performing tasks in the setting of other disciplines; i.e., using fuzzy logic as an 
instrumental tool. 
Fuzzy logic has recently undergone an extraordinary popularization and scientific dissemination in 
several mass media. The adjective ‘fuzzy’ gained wide popularity at least in two different prominent 
media: reporting and advertising. The advertisement as a ‘propaganda’ of the ‘fuzzy’ label has been 
favoured by the stamp of the fuzzy logic brand as a synonym for reliability and innovation in consumer 
products such as washing machines, video cameras or tensiometers. Thus, it has become common to 
see certain well-known trademarks including labels such as ‘made with fuzzy logic’ or ‘fuzzy-logic-
controlled’ into their products. The scientific dissemination of fuzzy logic has been encouraged by the 
robustness of its solutions and the ease of its management. This has given rise to an increasing number 
of textbooks, which include chapters devoted to fuzzy logic, not only in the field of Logic itself, but 
also in Computing, Analytical Philosophy and Linguistics. References to fuzzy logic in books on 
Social Sciences (Education, Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology) also abound, especially those 
dealing with methodological aspects, as this logic provides an adaptive and efficient analysis of aspects 
such as subjectivity or instability, characteristics of their subject matter. 
The increasing presence of fuzzy logic in scientific, cultural, educational, commercial and 
technological fields demands a kind of literacy in the basic principles of approximate reasoning. In this 
task it would be useful to have good examples in order to introduce the basics of fuzzy logic in a 
rigorous, but at the same time, enjoyable way. With this in mind, this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2 we introduce the basics fuzzy logic, emphasizing the differences with boolean logic and 
probability. In 3 we illustrate, step by step, how to model an example of approximate reasoning in 
cycling using fuzzy logic, considering that education should encourage students with intuitive 
examples, and that the lessons must be proportionate to the age of pupils. Finally, the conclusions and 
references close this work. 
2. Boolean logic, probability and fuzzy logic 
One of the most relevant features that define us as human beings is that of possessing the capability 
to reason. Traditionally, the science of reasoning is deductive logic, since Aristotelian deductive logic 
was associated to syllogism. A syllogism is a logical argument in which a quantified statement (the 
conclusion) follows from other two quantified statements (the premises). Both the premises and the 
conclusion are made up of precise statements and the only quantifiers admitted are all and some (in 
their positive and negative forms). Valid syllogisms are those in which the conclusion follows 
unequivocally from premises; i.e., if the syllogism is correct, there is no counterexample making the 
premises true and the conclusion false. A typical example of valid syllogism is: 
 
 




All quadrilaterals are figures 
No triangle is quadrilateral 
________________________________ 
Therefore, some figures are not triangles 
 
This example comes from Mathematics, the science par excellence of precise reasoning. As 
Rowland puts in [10], Mathematics as a final or finished product is usually performed as a timeless and 
exact knowledge, leaving aside any trait of ambiguity or vagueness in its expression. But although the 
justificatory context of Mathematics seems to be accurate, the discovery context is peppered with 
several kinds of vagueness, as the same author shows. Beyond that, crisp reasoning has severe 
limitations. Many statements employed in every-day arguments are imprecise or vague. For example, 
along the lines of the Aristotelian syllogistic modes, from the premises: 
 
Almost all young people are healthy 




it is not strictly possible to derive any conclusion. Two factors are relevant in precluding a conclusion: 
(1) the first and the second premise include uncovered quantifiers in the Aristotelian syllogistic 
(almost, few) and (2) there is no perfect matching between the words representing the middle term, 
even if ‘healthy’ and ‘salutary’ are synonyms. However, using common sense, most people would say 
that some conclusion can be reached from the premises: in particular, among others, that ‘Few young 
people use drugs’. 
Imprecise or approximate reasoning play an important role in our daily lives and it would seem 
imperative to deal with it. Traditionally, several logics are devoted to dealing with the imprecision; two 
of the most successful are probabilistic logic and, more recently, fuzzy logic. Although both focus on 
imprecision, their subject of study and objectives are different. Loosely speaking, one can say that 
while probability deals with uncertainty, fuzziness addresses vagueness. We shall now go on to 
examine this. 
There are four types of sentences relating determinate/indeterminate, crisp/vague. Focusing on 
these, a sentence can be classifiable as (a) determinate and crisp, (b) indeterminate and crisp, (c) vague 
and determinate, (d) vague and indeterminate.  An example of (a) is ‘A triangle has three angles’. An 
example of (b) is ‘I throw a die and it is a multiple of 3’. An example of (c) is ‘Swallowing about 30 
grams of Amanita Phalloides is lethal’. An example of (d) is ‘Athletes are tall’. Although we shall not 
focus specifically on (a) and (c) examples, we shall point to a difference between them. Both (a) and 
(c) are true, but in a different way: while (a) is a necessary truth—it follows from the definition of 
triangle, (c) is, however, a contingent or experimental truth; i.e., almost everyone who swallows 30 
grams of Amanita is endangering his/her life, but there may be people who exhibit a particular 
tolerance or weakness to the poison, with more or less than 30 g being required to cause death. For the 
purpose of differentiating fuzziness from probability, the relevant examples are (b) and (d). 




While (b) is an example of a probabilistic statement, (d) is an example of a vague sentence: they 
help us to distinguish between probability and fuzziness. Returning to the aforementioned sentence, ‘I 
throw a die and it is a multiple of 3’, we can note that if the die is perfect (not manipulated or 
misconstrued), each of its faces has a 1/6 probability of coming out and, as probability is an additive 
measure, the probability of ‘getting a multiple of 3’ can be calculated as follows: 
 
prob(multiple of 3)= prob({3} + {6})=prob({3} )+ prob({6})=1/6+1/6=2/6=1/3. 
 
Thus, ‘getting a multiple of’ 3 is an indeterminate sentence, not an imprecise or vague one [13]. 
Before throwing the dice we don’t know if we are going to get a multiple of 3 or not, but afterwards, 
the outcome can be only true or false. No other alternative is possible. Someone may argue that we can 
also say that the probability that an athlete is a tall person is high. This is true. But what seems really 
difficult is to assign a single value between 0 and 1 to that statement.  
Unlike the sentence ‘get a multiple of 3’, the phrase ‘Athletes are tall’ is vague. Although we can 
substitute the height of each athlete for a precise measurement, the sentence is vague because there are 
individuals named as ‘tall and ‘not tall’ by different people. Vague individuals are ‘borderline cases’; 
i.e., cases not firmly true or false. Furthermore, for the same person, an individual may be tall enough 
for some sports (hockey) but not for others (basketball). Only if we know the sport that he or she is 
involved in can we reasonably say if he or she is tall or not. Vague predicates are context-dependent. 
‘Young’, ‘tall’ or ‘happy’ are all examples of vague meanings, but fuzzy logic focuses only on 
vague predicates that are measurable. ‘Youth’ and ‘height’ are measurable, but not ‘happiness’ (at least 
not in the same way). A measurable vague predicate P can be represented by a curve (a function), fP. 
The curve determines the degree to which a given object satisfies certain property or not. Graded 
properties are represented by fuzzy sets. A fuzzy set over a universe X is defined by its generalized 
membership function, usually denoted by µP(x), representing the compatibility to attribute the property 
P to a given element x or, in other interpretation, the possibility to soundly attribute P to x. In this latter 
sense, as Zadeh noted in [16], it is said that a vague predicate is characterized by its possibility 
distribution, i.e., by the specification of the degree to which each element of the universe is compatible 
with the meaning of the predicate. By way of example, in the universe U=[0, 10], the vague predicate 
‘small’ can be represented by the following possibility distribution:  
µs(x)= {0/1, 1/0,1, 2/0,2 ,..., 10/0} 
i.e., the compatibility of 0 with the predicate ‘small number’ is 1 or, in an alternative way, the 
possibility of calling 0 a ‘small number’ is 1, …, and so on. 
Vague properties, unlike crisp ones, are not an all or nothing matter. There is no universal definition 
of ‘young’, as there is for a ‘triangle’. ‘Triangle’ induces a perfect classification of geometric figures: 
something is either a triangle or it is not. But vague predicates, such as ‘young’ or ‘tall’, can be used 
differently depending on the context. Thus, evaluating an individual as ‘young’ perhaps will vary 
depending on whether we are talking about a competitive chess player or a teacher; a person is not 
categorized as ‘tall’ in the same way for a basketball team as for a cycling team. Depending on the 
context, the representation of the meaning of ‘young’ or ‘tall’ may vary, even slightly. But in each 
case, its representation is precise. Fuzzy logic is a matter of degree, but it is a precise logic 





Consider the difference between the representation of a vague predicate and a crisp one. For 
example, in the universe U=[0, 10], the crisp predicate P= greater or equal to five has only one 
possible use and the curve (membership function, f) representing it will be (Figure 1): 





0  5 
configuring a two-step function. 
In contrast, in the universe U=[0, 100] the vague predicate P’=old can be used or interpreted slightly 
differently. The following are three different curves that can be consistently used attending to the 
meaning of ‘old’ (Figure 2): 








The curve shows that if you are below 50, then you are not old. If you are over 70, you are old. 
Between 50 and 70 years, the curve increases but differently in the three representations: if Peter is 62 
years old, the degree of compatibility of his age with the first curve for ‘old’ is greater than with the 
second and lower than with the third. But in all cases, albeit with slight differences, the curves show 
the degree in which ‘Peter is young’ considering only his numerical age (62). 
Fuzzy sets may be conjoined, disjoined or negate. Let us look at an example of conjunction (). Let 
F be the fuzzy set =around 5 kilos (F) and S=around 6 kilos (S). Both predicates are represented by the 
following membership functions (µF, µS).  








We can ask for an object whose weight is around 5 and 6 kilos. That is a conjunction. In the theory 
of fuzzy sets, the copula can be represented by the min connective, i.e, fFS(x)=min(fF(x), fS(x)). Thus, 
the new sentence will be represented by this new function (Figure 4): 
Figure 4. Representation of the predicate around 5 and 6 kilos. 
 
 
showing the compatibility of a given weight with the predicate around 5 and 6 kilos. The new 
representation is consistent with common sense: an object of 5.5 kilos is around 5 and 6 kilos with a 
greater degree than an object of 4.7 kilos. Note that, unlike probability, fuzzy logic is not additive. 
Thus, the compatibility of an object being ‘around 5 and 6 kilos’ is not the sum of the compatibility of 
that object being around 5 kilos and being around 6 kilos (it will be considerably greater). 
Fuzzy logic shows its suitability for dealing with inexact or vague predicates not only in everyday 
cases, but also in scientific knowledge—including mathematical knowledge—approaching cases, 
where not everything is classifiable as ‘black and white’ [7]. Vagueness and fuzzy logic has gained 
increasing prominence in the contemporary scientific landscape. There are over 280,000 papers in the 
scientific literature with the label ‘fuzzy’ in the title. There are over 22,383 papers listed in 
Math.Sci.Net database alone. There are 25 journals with ‘fuzzy’ in the title and close to 25,000 patents 
in USA and Japan built on fuzzy technologies. Fuzzy logic has proved useful in managing approximate 
reasoning, in both theoretical and applied spheres and, thus, should be taught in higher education; 
particularly, in degrees in Mathematics and Computer Science. 
In the setting of Polya’s contribution [9], we appreciate teaching science topics through examples. 
Examples should illustrate familiar situations, even if they are complex. Toy examples included in 
textbooks usually do not show the complexity underlying the matters approached and, consequently, 




the worth of the theory used to solve them. The example that we will develop in this paper is intended 
to be both complex and familiar, and aims to overcome the deficiencies alluded to above. 
The example that we will introduce below is drawn from the world of sport and, in particular, from 
cycling. It is aimed at beginners in approximate reasoning; in particular, for students of Philosophy, 
Mathematics and Computer Science. The example will be developed step by step, explaining 
alternatives and elections. I agree with Garrido [6] regarding the relevance of adapting the educative 
material to the audience; of adjusting the level and manner of introducing fuzzy logic to pupils. What 
follows is an attempt towards a contribution to this task. 
3. Teaching the basics of fuzzy logic through an example (by way of cycling) 
Anyone who has been cycling has, either, consciously or unconsciously, reasoned along the lines of: 
‘To go fast, I have to switch to a very small freewheel and a large chainring’. As any cyclist knows, the 
bicycle speed depends on the ratio transmitted to the chain; i.e., on the number of teeth on the 
freewheel and on the number of teeth on the chainring. The reasoning, informally stated above, is 
actually an enthymeme: it hides some premise. More specifically, the rule that makes it possible to 
reach the conclusion using the information included in the premise (the ratio used) is omitted. An 
explicit representation of the argument is as follows: 
Premises:  
P1: On a bicycle, with a small freewheel and a large chainring, I go fast. 
P2: I selected a very small freewheel and a very large chainring. 
Conclusion: 
C: I go very fast. 
To perform a formal model of this reasoning, fuzzy logic must to provide: 
i. A representation of the vague lexicon included in the premises (in bold): ‘On a bicycle, with a 
small freewheel and a large chainring, I go fast and ‘I selected a very small freewheel and a 
very large chainring’. 
ii. A method for inferring a conclusion. As a conclusion follows from imprecise premises, it must 
be approximate, providing information according to what the premises do (‘I go really fast’). 
No doubt about the imprecise character of the premises. ‘Very’, is a linguistic label, generally an 
adverb of quantity that qualifies the meaning of the adjectives (small, large) that they modify. In 
effect, the bike does not move forward without any shade of meaning; but advances ‘little’, ‘a lot’, 
‘really fast’, ... the freewheels are not ‘big’ or ‘small’ exclusively, but ‘very big’, ‘small enough’,…; 
that is the usual way to refer to our choice of gear. We need this granularity to explain why we are 
going slow, very slow, fast or very fast. And to represent these singularities we resort to fuzzy logic. 
3.1 Preliminaries 
In order to model a problem involving vague language adequately, we must consider the following 
specificities: 
 
Vague predicates are context dependent and represented by a generalized membership function. 




Vague predicates are quite common in natural language and they contrast with crisp predicates, 
which are timeless, generally belonging to the world of mathematics, an ideal realm of pure thoughts 
where everything is or is not—thus, the number 3 is prime or not; a triangle is scalene or it is not, etc. 
On the contrary, ordinary language (the language we use to communicate) is full of words that cannot 
be defined completely, once and for all, without regard to context.  
Crisp predicates often lack context or have a quite general context: e.g., in the universe of natural 
numbers, 7 is a prime number regardless of whether we refer to a subset or to another subset of . 
Vague predicates, nevertheless, are contextual, local. Thus, considering the same route, a chainring of 
52 teeth will be small for a professional cyclist and large for an amateur cyclist. Even a single ratio can 
be qualified by one cyclist as large or small depending on whether it is used in a flat time trial or in a 
hilly time trial.  
Fuzzy logic provides models for representing vagueness in context. By way of example, in the 
universe U=[0, 6], ‘numbers less than 3’ and ‘numbers far from 3’ would be represented as follows 
(Figure 5): 
Figure 5. (a) Numbers less than 3. (b) Numbers far from 3, U=[0,6] 
 
But note that, considering another universe, U = [0, 9], while the representation of the predicate 
‘numbers less than 3’ does not change (‘less than’ is a crisp predicate), the representation of ‘numbers 
far from 3’ is altered, as shows the right figure below. In effect, you can check that the figures for ‘far 
from 3’ mismatch in the range 3-6 (Figure 6). 




Figure 6. (a) Numbers less than 3. (b) Numbers far from 3, U=[0,9] 
 
The figures show graphically that while crisp predicates are context independent, vague predicates 
are always sensitive to the universe of reference. While crisp predicates classify the world in black and 
white, vague predicates put objects on a gray scale. 
Just as a crisp predicate is characterized by its precise membership function (1 or 0 values), a vague 
predicate is represented by a generalized membership function; i.e., by the attribution of degrees of 
membership to the elements of the universe of reference. Thus, the generalized membership function 
that corresponds to the vague predicate ‘numbers far from 3’, U=[0, 6], can be recovered by the top 
figure and can be summarized as follows: 
if 0x3, x is far from 3 with degree   (1) 
if 3x6, x is far from 3 with degree  (2) 
Considering only the integer values, the meaning of the imprecise predicate ‘number far from 3’ is 
represented by the following set of element-value pairs: 
A(u)=0/1; 1/0,66; 2/0,33; 3/0; 4/0,33; 5/0,66; 6/1 (3) 
i.e.: 0 is far from 3 with degree 1; 1 is far from 3 with degree 0,66; 2 is far from 3 with degree 0,33… 
The fuzzy set ‘number far from 3’ (A) is characterized by the membership function A, representing 
the degree to which each element of the universe of discourse is compatible with what the vague 
predicate means. But one may ask why to propose this representation and not others, such as the 
following: 




Figure 7. Other representations of the predicate ‘numbers far from 3’. 
 
We can see that while Figure 7 (a) relativizes the distance, Figure 7 (b) seems to accentuate it. 
Figure 6 (b) represents perhaps the most balanced interpretation. If two representations of the same 
predicate disagree significantly, then refereeing would be required. Refereeing will be based on: 
(a) checking that the universe of discourse is the same; (b) performing an experiment that yields 
evidence about what is the best or most appropriate representation; (c) speaking about the admissible 
interpretations of the predicate, in order to provide the more faithful representation of its meaning 
(commonly understood as its use). So, if a person says that there are few road accident victims in a 
weekend and another says there are many, one must note that both assess the problem in the same 
context (i.e., in the context of last year, the last weekend, compared with industrial accidents, etc.). If, 
even using the same context, serious divergences emerge, we must collect data to fully address the 
discussion. Once the data are known, it is possible to appeal to rationality: nobody in their right mind 
would say, at this moment in Spain, that 2, for example, constitutes a large number of accidents in one 
weekend, and nobody can judiciously justify that 60 are very few. There are bands of road accidents 
(e.g., 10, 15,) that have no clear assessment. For such cases, a level of agreement is required in order to 
reach a consensus about what the phrase ‘Few road accidents in one weekend’ means. 
 
Complex sentences accept several valuations. 
 
Once we have a way to represent the imprecise meaning of simple sentences with fuzzy sets, we 
may ask how to evaluate complex sentences; i.e., how to make negations, disjunctions, conjunctions or 
conditionals from atomic sentences. There are several ways to negate, aggregate or condition vague 
sentences, which we now go on to examine. 
A fuzzy negation operator n is a function n: [0,1]  [0,1] that is strictly decreasing (n(a)>n(b), if 
a<b), continuous, and which satisfies the classical conditions of limit (n(1)=0; n(0)=1) and involution 
(n(n(a))=a. If a1-a2=n(a2)-n(a1) for all a1, a2 [0, 1], n(a)=1-a is the only negation. If that condition is 
not met, there are other negation operators. For example, if we represent the meaning of the predicate 
‘small’ in U = [0, 1] by the following membership function: 
 
1 if 0  0.3











its negation (not_small) could be characterized by, 
 
0 if 0 0.3








or by   
 
 
0 if 0 0.3





Graphically (Figure 8): 
Figure 8. Several negation functions. 
 
There are also several ways to intersect or join fuzzy sets. Choosing one of the alternatives depends 
on the meaning of the sentences under conjunction or disjunction. Thus, taking the first example, if the 
sentences denote situations that are independent between themselves, as occurs in ‘He was climbing 
the pass using a small freewheel’ and ‘He was well hydrated’, the use of the min connective to conjoin 
and the max connective to disjoin is advisable. But if the information is mutually influenced, as in ‘I 
was climbing the pass using a small freewheel’ and ‘I was climbing the pass using a big chainring’, 
then the use of the product connective for conjunction and the sum minus product connective for 
disjunction is more adequate. Indeed, it would seem to be plausible to say that if a cyclist uses a small 
freewheel, with degree 0.8, and he is (badly) hydrated, with degree 0.3, the confidence of gaining 
greater speed should be reduced to the poor hydration level. In turn, we know that, for speed, the 
choice of the freewheel teeth and the election of the chainring teeth are both in interdependence. 
Therefore, if someone chooses a small freewheel, with degree 0.8 (very small), and a large chainring 
with degree 0.3 (slightly larger), the prevision for achieving a certain speed are slightly below that the 
degree of the chainring (0.24), because, as it is little big, does not favour the expectations generated by 
selecting a small freewheel. Therefore, there are several ways to conjoin and to disjoin. The following 
are some of the most frequently used t-norms and t-conorms: 




Table 1. Types of t-norms and t-conorms. 
















Two fuzzy sets are also related if one conditions the other. A fuzzy conditional is usually a 
straightforward generalization of the typical ways in which the classic material conditional can be 
defined. Depending on which definition is selected, two principal families can be distinguished:  
S-conditionals and R-conditionals. 
S-conditionals generalize the classical definition abab replacing  with a t-conorm S and  
with a fuzzy complement. It follows that ab  S(n(a), b). If we take n(a)=1-a, then S(n(a), b)=S(1-a, 
b). If we substitute S with a quoted union, we obtain the conditional Lukasiewicz conditional: IL(a, 
b)=min(1, 1-a+b); if S is max, we obtain the Kleene-Dienes conditional: IK(a, b)=max(1-a, b). 
The family of R-conditionals are obtained by generalization: ab  supx[0, 1] | axb. 
Replacing  with the product, we obtain the Goguen’s conditional: 
 
, min 1, if
1 i.o.c
 (9) 
If we use T(a, b)=max(0, a+b-1), we obtain the Lukasiewicz conditional. 
Since conditional operators are designed based on t-norms and t-conorms, there are a wide variety 
of them. There are up to 40 and there is empirical evidence to diagnose their suitability for different 
interpretations of the meanings of fuzzy conditional sentences. A. Sobrino and S. Fernández [11] have 
developed an extraction system for conditional rules, applying the same to a book of music. The 
method conjectures the conditional operator that best reflects the meaning of the conditional sentence. 
For example, when information between antecedent and consequent interacts and, thus, it is non-
commutative, as in ‘The more severe the trial, the greater the sentence’ the Kleene-Dienes alternative 
would seem to be a suitable choice: ab=max(1-a, b). But if the information contains a certain 
symmetry, as happens in ‘If the measure of a piece is incomplete with respect to its extent, the latter 
must to provide the value of the time remaining, completing the symmetry of the whole’, then the 
appropriate election would be the Mamdani operator: ab=min(a, b), as min(a, b)=min(b, a). The 
examples resorted to show fuzzy logic as a matter of approximation, design and experimentation. 
Approximation, as evaluating the meaning of the sentences is a matter of degree; design, as we 
endeavour to adapt the formal models to the peculiarities of the vague meaning; and, experimentation, 








Fuzzy inference allows different modalities. 
Once we know how to assess complex fuzzy propositions, let us not go on to see how the values are 
transmitted from propositions-premises to a proposition-conclusion. There are several modalities of 
approximate inference [5]: 
 Compositional inference 
 Inference by analogy or compatibility  
 Interpolative inference 
The most common way to formalize vague reasoning is the so-called compositional inference or 
generalized Modus Ponens, which we shall refer to in order to model the example employed in the 
present study. 
But first we shall briefly review the other two modes of inference. 
In the inference by analogy, using a similarity measure, we calculate the degree to which the 
perception or fact named by the premise satisfies the antecedent of the rule. This degree is transferred 
to the conclusion. In schematic form: 
Table 2. Scheme of inference by analogy. 
X is A’ 
If X is A then Y is C 
A’ is γ compatible with (or similar to) A 
C’ is γ compatible with C 
Hausdorff’s distance is frequently used to define the similarity as the inverse of that distance. 
The interpolative inference (Figure 9) arises generalizing the fuzzy relation ‘to be between’ applied 
to rules that define paradigmatic or prototypical examples: 






i.e., interpolation enables us to conclude that C’ is between C1 and C2 to approximately the same extent 
that A’ is between A1 and A2.  
While models by analogy use a simple rule, the interpolative reasoning requires two or more rules 
to provide information with which to generate a conclusion. In this regard, it also differs from the 
compositional inference, which will be described below. 


















Table 3. Compositional rule of inference. 
Rule 
Perception or fact 
If X is A then Z is D 
X is A* 
Conclusion? Z is D* 
where A* is similar to A and the rule, if correct, should conclude one D* similar to D. 
Which of these forms of approximate reasoning should be used to model the example used in the 
present study? There is no sense in using interpolative reasoning: there are not two rules, but only one. 
We are led, therefore, to choose between the inference by analogy and the compositional inference. In 
reasoning by analogy, the compatibility between the fact and the antecedent of the rule is established. 
In the compositional inference, as its name indicates, we compound or mix the fact and the rule in 
order to provide a conclusion. Both methods would seem to be suitable for modelling our example. 
Here we will choose the compositional rule of inference, as it is more traditional. We now go on to 
consider the above quoted schema in more detail. 
The rule ‘if X is A then Z is D’ is valued as a fuzzy conditional linking the condition (A) and the 
conditioned by the premise (D): 
, ,  (10) 
where C is the most appropriate conditional operator relating the meaning of A and D. The perception 
or fact X is A* is represented by a value that will be the extent to which X is consistent with what A* 
means. Since there are two premises, the value of the fact or perception is conjoined with each of the 
possibilities that offer the rule using the most appropriate t-norm. The highest of these values is 
ascribed to the conclusion. In summary: 
, ,  (11) 
for a continuous t-norm T and for all w. 
3.2 Numerical Models for representing the example 
Let us now see how to model the example used in the present study, taking the caveats referred to in 
the above paragraphs into account. We recall: 
Given the premises: 
P1: On a bicycle, with a small freewheel and a large chainring, I go fast. 
P2: I selected a very small freewheel and a very large chainring. 
we can ask what conclusion can be expected. 
First, we have to represent the information involved in the premises. Let SF be the predicate ‘small 
freewheel’ and LC, ‘large chainring’. Suppose we have agreed that SF and LC are well defined by the 
following possibility distributions. 
 
 




Table 4. Proposition of the antecedent of the rule, premise_1. 
SF(x)= {12/0.9; 16/0.6; 20/0.4; 24/0.1} 
LC(y)= {33/0.1; 52/0.9} 
12, 16, 20 and 24 being the number of teeth of the freewheel, and 33 and 52 the number of teeth of the 
chainring. 
Let GF be the predicate ‘go fast’, represented by the following possibility distribution: 
Table 5. Consequence of rule, premise_1. 
GF(z)= {3/0.1; 6/0.5; 9/0.9} 
 
where 3, 6 are 9 are the meters moved forward with each revolution of the chainring. 
First, we have to combine the information ‘small freewheel’ and ‘large chainring’. As freewheels 
and chainrings interact to achieve more or less speed, we use the t-norm product to represent the 
conjunction thereof. This combination of freewheels and chainrings gives rise to a ‘big ratio’ (BR) 
SF(x)  LC(y)=BR(x,y) and its values are reflected in the following table: 
Table 6. Conjunction of propositions that are the antecedent of the rule. 
BR(x,y) 12 16 20 24 
33 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.01 
52 0.81 0.0.54 0.36 0.09 
 
Now we can calculate the values of the conditional clause ‘If I select a big ratio, I go fast’, 
BRGF(w). First, we analyze the rule we intend to model interpreting the meaning and the dependence 
or independence of their predicates, choosing the most appropriate conditional operator. In this case, 
‘If I select a big ratio, I go fast’, can be interpreted as: 
1. I select a big ratio and I go fast. 
2. Or I do not select a big ratio or I go fast 
3. Or I do not select a big ratio, or I do and I go fast. 
4. Or I do not select a big ratio or I go at a speed proportional to the ratio selected. 
1 shows a case where the material conditional is satisfied: the condition and the conditioned are true 
but exclude the hypothetical character of the antecedent and, thus, the possibility that the condition 
does not hold. The other three cases do include this feature. 2 show the traditional interpretation: either 
the antecedent is met or it is not. 3 add some kind of completeness: either the antecedent fails, or the 
antecedent and the consequent are satisfied. Lastly, 4 say that either the antecedent fails or the 
consequent is proportional, depending on the degree of satisfaction of the antecedent. For our example, 
3 or 4 may be appropriate interpretations. 3 is a sound interpretation as it expresses the congruence 
between ‘go fast’ and ‘big ratio’ quite well and because, if the condition is given, the interaction 
between the condition and the conditioned can be calculated by the t-norm product. It is not a good 
choice if the condition is poorly satisfied and if the difference with the degree of satisfaction of the 




conditioned is large; in such a case, the conditional tends to be true, not owing to any consistency 
between the values of the condition and the conditioned, but because, as the condition is weakly true, 
the conditional tends to be true. 4 is also an acceptable option as, in an approximate scenario, we must 
conclude in proportion to the available information. The moral: not always there is just one single 
model to choose and not always will the choice selected be optimal for all cases. Thus we have to 
decide in a justifiable manner between alternatives not fully disjoint. Here we provide a number of 
reasons for choosing between two options: the conditional operator (ab)=1-a+ab, known as the 




Supposing we decided on the first (i.e., the definition by Reichenbach). According to this choice: 
Table 7. Premise_1 (Rule). 
BRGF(w) 12-33 12-52 16-33 16-52 20-33 20-52 24-33 24-52 
3 0.919 0.0.271 0.9406 0.514 0.964 0.676 0.991 0.919 
6 0.955 0.595 0.97 0.74 0.98 0.82 0.995 0.955 
9 0.9181 0.919 0.994 0.946 0.996 0.964 0.999 0.991 
 
These values should show the congruence between the speed selected and the progress made (3, 6, 9 
are the advanced meters). 
Once the value of the rule has been determined, let us now go on to see how to calculate the value 
of the perception or fact. The truth value of the fact is a modification of the value of the antecedent of 
the rule: compared with it, the only difference is that the adjective (small) is qualified by the adverb 
‘very’ (‘very small freewheel’) and, once again, ‘big’ is qualified by ‘very’ (‘very big chainring’)—
i.e., we perceive a very small freewheel and a very big chainring. In fuzzy logic, we know that if an 
element satisfies a predicate P in a degree, satisfies the predicate ‘very_P’ to a less extent. There is 
agreement that the square function captures this intuition; i.e., if P(u)=x, very_P(u)=x2. Taking into 
account this definition: 
very_SFvery_LC(x,y)=very_BR(x,y)=(BR(x,y))2 (13) 
Table 8. Premise_2 (Rule). 
very BR(x,y) 12 16 20 24 
33 0.0081 0.0036 0.0016 0.0001
52 0.6561 0.2916 0.1295 0.0081
 
We have values for the rule and for the perception or fact. What value should be passed on to the 
conclusion? Answering this question involves composing the values of the table denoting the meaning 




of the fact with the values shown in the table above representing the meaning of the rule. Following 
Zadeh’s rule, we obtain A* with the composition sup-T. In [13], Trillas et al. have proved that, if we 
use the Reichenbach conditional to model the rule (and that was our choice), the only t-norm that 
ensures consequences in the sense of Tarski is the bounded one; i.e., 
, ,  (14) 
Performing the calculus that the above formula suggests, we obtain the following values for A*(w): 
Table 9. Conclusion. 
GF*(w)= {3/0; 6/0.251; 9/0.5751} 
 
If we analyse the results, we can see that the values for 3 and 6 are very close to the square of the 
values of μGF for these same elements. The value for 9 is the most divergent (it should be around 0.81 
and, in fact, it is 0.5751). How can be expressed this answer? This matter is called, in the realm of 
fuzzy logic, ‘linguistic approximation’ and there are different techniques for solving it. Generally 
speaking, we can check that the obtained set μGF* is more similar to one that ideally represent ‘go very 
fast’ than to any other, and that is precisely the conclusion that a rational agent draws from the 
premises. The conclusion is approximate because the reasoning is so too; there is nothing special 
about it. 
This is an example of approximate reasoning with truths degree. By so doing, fuzzy logic is a 
multiple-valued multiple-logic; i.e., it is a family of infinitely-valued logics.  
But people reason, rather than with degrees, with linguistic expressions as those founded in the 
example above: ‘low speed’, ‘go fast’, etc. Is it possible to represent and manage the reasoning of our 
example-guide with this kind of linguistic labels? The answer is yes. Let us now go on to see how. 
3.3 Linguistic Models 
Let us agree that the knowledge relating speed and progress of a bicycle is showed by the following 
rules: 
 If the freewheel is small and the chainring is large, the progress made is remarkable 
 If the freewheel is medium and the chainring is medium, the progress made is moderate 
 If the freewheel is large and the chainring is small, little progress is made. 








Figure 10. Graphical representation of the fuzzy terms involved in the rules. 
 
where 12, 16, etc., are the number of teeth of the freewheel; 30, 52 are the number of teeth of the 
chainring and 3, 6, 9 are meters of forward progress. 
Suppose we observe that the bike has 16 teeth in the freewheel and 52 teeth in the chainring. What 
is the expected progress? To make this example more straightforward and illustrative, we use the t-
norm min to draw the conclusion, even though we argue previously that that choice was not entirely 
appropriate. In each figure, we represent the conditions of the problem and, immediately after, we 












Figure 11. Graphical representations of the rules using the t-norm min. 
 
Finally, among the min values we choose the supreme: 
Figure 12. Centre of area. 
 




Note that the centre of the area (Figure 12) dividing the figure highlighted in bold in two equal parts 
falls within the label ‘progress a lot’. This conclusion matches the observation and provides a solution 




The role of classical logic in teaching is unquestionable, as is stressed by the ASL (Association for 
Symbolic Logic) Committee on Logic and Education in [12]. The role of fuzzy thinking in student 
thinking is profitable even when the mathematical problems seem not to be fuzzy, as Zazkis pointed 
out in [18]. In this paper we have shown the expediency of literacy in fuzzy logic in higher education, 
motivated by the increasing relevance of fuzzy logic, as shown by its popularity and dissemination, not 
only in academia, but also in commercial activities, as evidenced by the success of its applications. In 
this regard, we believe that selecting stimulating examples can be significant. Teaching fuzzy logic 
through an example should exemplify how the premises are modelled, which alternatives are taken 
between the possible choices to model it, and how the conclusion follows from premises in a degree of 
truth proportional to the truth of the latter. In this work we develop an example for handling 
approximate reasoning on how to select a suitable gear ratio to attain a certain speed by pedalling. 
The example-guide developed in this paper shows that fuzzy logic is an adequate tool for managing 
approximate reasoning, providing plausible solutions to problems that, like those concerned with the 
decisions individuals take when cycling in order to make significant or little progress, are verbalized in 
an inexact or vague manner. Therefore, in its linguistic version, is an example of computing with 
words [17]. Fuzzy logic is shown as a tool for solving puzzles that occur with some frequency in 
everyday settings, being commonplace or relevant, but still lacking a precise specification (either 
because we cannot provide it or because, even being able to do so, we do not require more precision), 
furnishing solutions in terms of plausible conclusions. 
By modelling the example-guide of this work, we have attempted to conduct an exercise in logical 
analysis of the sentences including vague words, in the tradition inaugurated by M. Black in [4] and in 
the style employed by G. Polya in [9]. 
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